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The structure and financing of science and technology activities are undergoing a slow, but profound, 
change. This change can be briefly characterized as a shift from relying and supporting public science to a 
stronger emphasis on “market-based” incentives for science and technology. In this paper we analyze this 
shift in a historical perspective, discussing both the theoretical explanations and the empirical trends of the 
ongoing change. While we do not claim to provide a comprehensive and exhaustive identification of the 
causes of this shift, we argue that it is largely driven by the perception of a shift of the US policy towards 
market-based, rather than publicly support, incentives for science and technology. This, in turn – given the 
strong economic performance of the US over the 1990s – has influenced policies in most OECD countries, 
and especially in Europe. 
We conclude by analyzing the evolution of research in US higher education and find two major trends: an 
increasing diversity in the number of institutions of different types other than universities and a steady and 
continuous public funding of the leading US universities. This has allowed the construction of an 
infrastructure now used largely by the private sector, but it also noted that the US has not compromised 
public support for core areas or in those fields in which there is a clear perception that market incentives are 
not sufficient for meeting the strategic targets of the US policy. The implication is that there is a 
considerable “policy diversity” in the US practice and that all aspects of this diversity should be considered 
when using the US as a reference.  
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Today most of the financing for research and development (R&D) in the most advanced 
(technologically and economically) countries comes from private sources, rather than 
from public ones. Consequently, the great majority of R&D is performed in firms. 
Consider the data in Figure 1. With the exception of the less developed OECD countries, 
business expenditure on R&D accounts for the majority of total expenditure, and has an 
overwhelming share in the most developed countries1. 
 
































Business Expenditure on R&D as a Percentage of the Total Expenditure on R&D (1999)  
Figure 1- Business Expenditure on R&D as a Percentage of the Total Expenditure on R&D (1999). 
Source: US NSB, 2000, [1]. 
 
                                                 
1 For some countries (Sweden, Ireland), the business expenditure is driven in large part by foreign affiliates, 
which account for about 90% of the total business expenditure, rather than domestic firms. In the US 
domestic firms are dominant.  
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This fact is certainly not surprising. We hear ever more frequently that we live in 
knowledge-based economies2. A growing, and large, proportion of the world’s GDP is 
now “weightless”3. Progress in science and technology, ranging from agriculture to 
medicine, from telecommunications to transportation, have increased standards of living 
and have brought the world closer together. Fuelling this process with new ideas has 
become increasingly important for improving economic performance and well-being. 
Economic incentives are increasingly aligned to reward skills, creativity and innovation, 
with high valued-added activities being linked with producing “ideas” rather than with 
producing “things” [2,3] 
Firms, therefore, align their strategies to enhance the generation of new ideas. An 
important element, or perhaps manifestation, of these strategies is the allocation of firm 
private resources towards R&D. In fact, Baumol [9] has suggested that competition in 
advanced, market-based, democratic countries is principally based on the ability to 
generate ideas. Rather than price competition, there is an “arms-race” to innovate, 
whereby firms invest in R&D and innovation because they fear that failure to do so will 
allow a competitor to overtake them with a new product or process. This dynamic can 
explain, for example, Moore’s Law on the seemingly unstoppable improvements in 
performance of semiconductors [10]. 
While this dynamics characterizes most of the advanced economies, there is a generalized 
perception that it is particularly strong in the US, a point made by Baumol [9]. Further 
                                                 
2 Statements to this effect abound and here we provide a recent example [2], “The ability to create, 
distribute and exploit knowledge is increasingly central to competitive advantage, wealth creation and 
better standards of living.” The concept in Europe has been particularly studied, as in references [3,4], and 
recent OECD statements emphasize the role of science and technology for wealth creation [5].  
3 This results both from the increasing share of weightless services in employment and output, and the 
intangible value embedded in material objects (the software that exists in automobiles today, for example. 
Alan Greenspan [6] famously remarked that, in terms of physical weight, the US GDP at the end of the 
1990s was the same as in the beginning of the century. More recently, Baily [7] estimates show that the 
value of US GDP per pound rose from $3.64 in 1977 to $7.96 in 2000. Quah [8] gives examples for other 
countries. 
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evidence that the US relies heavily on private incentives can be understood to be a 
distinguishing characteristic of the US innovation-promotion system and not just its high 
reliance on private firms to fund R&D. In fact, as we saw in Figure 1, other advanced 
countries share this characteristic. Venture capital investments are higher in the US than 
in any other country and are particularly concentrated on high-technology sectors (Figure 
). 
 




























Share of high-technology sectors in total venture capital, 1995-99
Communications Information technology Health/biotechnology  
Figure 2- Share of venture capital devoted to high-technology ventures. Source: US NSB, 2000, [1]. 
 
The message emerging from this data seems unmistakable. S&T and innovation are, it 
seems, pushed forward by private financing. In fact, there has been a persistent and long 



























































































































Figure 3- Evolution of the ratio of Public vs. Public expenditure on R&D in the US. Source: US NSB, 
2000, [1]. 
 
Additionally, there has been an increasing reliance on market-based mechanisms to 
promote innovation. Changes in policy in the US have favored and resulted in the more 
intense use of private mechanisms for the promotion of innovation. Although there is a 
long tradition of supporting intellectual property rights in the US (it is part of the US 
Constitution), since the 1980s there has been an increasing intensification and 
strengthening of private incentives for innovation, namely by enlarging the scope and 
depth for patent protection. These policy changes have included, among other, the 
following: 
• The creation of a federal court focusing on patent litigation 
• The Bayh-Dole act, which has permitted outcomes of federal-funded (publicly 
funded) research to be patented 
• The increase breadth of patent claims allowed by the US Patent Office 
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• Widening of national patent and intellectual property rights to the global level 
(namely through the WTO Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, or 
TRIPS, agreements) 
While there is a wide controversy over the effect of these policy changes on patents, most 
scholars now accept that these changes have influenced decisively the number of patent 
applications4. Hall [12], in particular, has argued persuasively that there has been a 
“structural break” in the historical pattern of patents in  the mid-1980s : 
As several authors have demonstrated, the creation of a centralized court of appeals specializing in 
patent cases in 1982, together with a few well-publicized infringement cases in the mid-1980s, have 
led to an increased focus on patenting by firms in industries where patents have not traditionally been 
important, such as computers and electronics. 
Figure  (also from Hall) shows graphically the dramatic explosion in US patents 
associated with in the electric machinery, electronics, and instrument industries.  
 
 
Figure 4- Evolution of US Patent Office Utility Patents.  Adapted from Hall [12] 
                                                 
4 The alternative hypothesis, that there has really been an acceleration in technological innovation that has 
required more patenting, has been defended in  Kortum and Lerner [11]. 
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As is well known, patents are a crude and imperfect measure of innovation. In fact, with 
the exception of the chemical sector and the pharmaceutical industries, patents are only 
partially – and often tenuously - related with efforts to appropriate innovations, and are 
more related with gaining advantages in financing (entry or expansion) or as a defensive 
strategy to be used to dissuade patent infringement filings by competitors (notable in the 
computer, electronics and, more specifically, semiconductor industries). Still, for our 
purposes, it is enough to note the explosion in patenting as a result of the policy changes 
that center on providing private incentives to innovate. It is the effect, rather than the 
interpretation of the rationales or even the effectiveness of patents, that interests us here. 
The strong economic performance of the US economy over the 1990s outlined above, 
have contributed to a general and widespread shift towards market-based, rather than 
publicly-supported, incentives for science and technology in most OECD countries, and, 
especially, in Europe [3,4]. In fact, the conclusions of the European Union 
intergovernmental summit held in Lisbon in 2000 (i.e., the so-called “Lisbon Council”) 
can be interpreted as a call for Europe to enact policies that, in part, seek to replicate and 
improve upon the innovation-based economic performance that has characterized US 
economic growth [13,14]. 
This paper argues that “replicating” the US policy changes in different national and 
economic contexts can be not only misguided, but even ineffective and possibly harmful. 
To make this point, the paper examines, in section 2, the impacts of incentives to promote 
science and technology. In fact, it seems that in designing policies to stimulate 
innovation, the analytical and conceptual insights that have been made over the last 50 
years are forgotten or dismissed. Then, in section 3, the paper takes a more detailed look 
at the actual US policies. This empirical analysis shows that, despite the perceptions and 
what one might be inclined to conclude from the discussion above, the actual US policies 
to promote innovation and to support science and technology are more complex than  a 
mere shifting of the pendulum from public to private incentives. Section 4 briefly 
presents our main conclusions. 
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2- Analytical Perspectives on Promoting Technological Innovation and Scientific 
Progress 
The promotion of technological innovation and of scientific progress depends on the 
generation of knowledge. Knowledge has very specific characteristics that make it 
different from most kinds of goods. To be precise, we are considering only codified 
knowledge, thus excluding from our analysis tacit knowledge. Polanyi’s [15,16]  
definition of tacit knowledge is helpful. Polanyi defined as “tacit” knowledge that 
knowledge which people have but unaware that they have. Cowan, David and Foray [17] 
argue that not all types of non-codified knowledge are tacit in the original Polanyi’s 
sense, and that the term “tacit” is used abusively. These aspects, however, will matter 
little to our discussion centered on codified knowledge. Virtual all conceptual analyses of 
knowledge depart from (or replicate) the work of Nelson [18] and of Arrow [19] on the 
economics of information. Their key insight was to articulate the fact that knowledge is 
inherently a public good. Codified knowledge is “non-rival” in consumption: it can be 
possessed and used jointly by as many as care to do so. The nonrivalry of codified 
knowledge has also been defined as “infinite expansibility”, namely by Dasgupta and 
David [20], who favor a more descriptive term for this property. Additionally, knowledge 
is also typically non-excludable, in the sense that is difficult (costly) to retain exclusive 
possession of codified knowledge while this knowledge is being put to use. 
The public good nature of knowledge implies that, as Arrow [19] indicated, it will be 
undersupplied in decentralized markets. The reason for undersupply in competitive 
markets is simple: the costs of production are decoupled from the benefits of 
consumption. Consider Pythagoras’s theorem: the cost of producing this specific instance 
of codified knowledge was born entirely by Pythagoras himself millennia ago, but the 
benefits have been accrued freely by generations, and will continue to be so in the future. 
This is true also for knowledge embodied in tangible goods. Or consider a vaccine or a 
drug. These are examples of combinations of intangible codified knowledge (the 
formulation of a vaccine or of a drug) with tangible embodiments (the physical 
mechanism for the delivery of the drug or the vaccine). Both the codified knowledge and 
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the tangible embodiments are costly to the producer, but only the tangible part is costly to 
the consumer or to a rival5. 
It is important to note that the lack of incentives for knowledge production in competitive 
markets does not mean that it cannot be privately supplied nor does it imply that it must 
necessarily be produced by the state. Rather, it entails that some type of incentive 
structure must be adopted that rewards the efforts of creation. It is not our analytical 
argument that in the absence of these needed incentive structures no knowledge would be 
produced.  Disinterested individuals or magnanimous firms would likely emerge to invest 
in the generation of some knowledge even without any reward. However, certainly the 
level of knowledge supplied would not be as abundant as when institutionalized incentive 
mechanisms were in place to compensate creative efforts in the production of codified 
knowledge. 
So what have been the solutions to these knowledge provision problems that have 
emerged over time? We start with a brief historical overview. Two main incentive 
structures (intellectual property rights – IPRs – and public support) emerged to stimulate 
the production of knowledge, [22]. These incentive structures have had a different 
historical evolution. Each incentive structure has also radically different implications in 
the way in which knowledge is made available and diffused. We discuss the evolution 
and characteristics of each in turn and move, in a second step, to summarize the way they 
are currently understood and implemented. 
 
2.1 The Emergence of IPRs 
Historically, the incentive mechanism that has successfully stimulated the generation of 
knowledge is also the most natural one: let the discoverer profit at will from the 
knowledge that he/she has produced. To profit, however, the knowledge discovered 
would have to be kept from others through secrecy. Following David [23], in the 
                                                 
5 The discussion of the combination of intangible codified knowledge with tangible embodiments draws 
from Gallini and Scotchmer [21]. 
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medieval and Renaissance traditions of alchemy the objective was to discover some 
formulae that would bring power over material things. These formulae would be kept 
secret and used only for the benefit of the discoverer. Geographical knowledge of trade 
routes and accurate maps would be kept from the public domain and used only by the 
merchants or rulers for military or mercantile gains. Craftsmen kept close watch over the 
technologies used in their trade, even when no formal guild restrictions applied. 
Secrecy continues to be used today as a means to protect knowledge but the same 
principle of attributing to the discoverer the power to exclude others from access to new 
knowledge has been institutionalized in the incentive structure of IPRs. Secrecy is rather 
limited as a means to restricting others from using knowledge, since it may possible to 
understand the underlying knowledge embodied in a product or associated with a certain 
process of production. With IPRs knowledge is made excludable, since the creator has 
the right to exclude others from access to the creation. If this is the case, private market 
incentives work: the creator provides access to knowledge only to those who are willing 
to pay compensation for access and/or usage. 
IPRs are an extension of the traditional incentives for knowledge generation associated 
with the secrecy of the medieval era and Renaissance. IPRs constitute powerful 
incentives for knowledge generation, and, as Kahn and Sokoloff [24] note, were included 
in the first article of the US Constitution precisely with the intention of providing a 
stimulus for the “progress of science and of the useful arts”. Kahn and Sokoloff trace the 
development of patenting and of patent institutions throughout the 19th century in the US, 
showing the parallel growth in patents and the development of institutional arrangements 
to protect and to market (exchange through intermediaries) new knowledge. A key 
feature of patents is that they are driven by demand (or the expectation of demand), as 
Kanh and Sokoloff [24] note, describing the evolution of patenting in the US throughout 
the 19th century: “[the] close relationship between access to markets and patenting is 
certainly consistent with the view that inventive activity was responsive to material 




2.2 The Emergence of Open Science and Public Support to the Production of Knowledge 
At the same time that IPRs were taking hold in the US, in Europe a second means to 
institutionalize incentives for knowledge generation was emerging. This second 
institutional structure was based on dramatically different incentives with very distinct, 
even opposite, effects on the dissemination of knowledge. In post-Renaissance Europe a 
system of aristocratic patronage by rulers and nobles (both lay and ecclesiastical), 
concerned with the “ornamental” benefits of the discoveries of the philosophers and 
savants they sponsored, planted the seeds for a research culture of open science [23]. 
Rather than keeping the discoveries private, the incentives were oriented towards the 
rapid and wide dissemination of the new achievements, to enhance the prestige and 
power of the patron. Those sponsored by others in turn scrutinized these discoveries, to 
make sure that the claims to grandeur were legitimate. The philosophers that consistently 
showed ability to produce important discoveries gained reputation, a reputation that was 
based on the wide dissemination and scrutiny of their discoveries. 
Today the rules of engagement of the scientific community are based on this second 
incentive structure. Robert Merton [25] described these rules, in which incentives for 
discovery are associated with reputation building, which, in turn, is based on rapid, wide 
and comprehensive disclosure of the new knowledge. This openness entails that the 
public good nature of knowledge is preserved, which is compatible with a reward 
structure based on accepted claims to priority within a college of peers. Stephan [26], 
following on the seminal sociological work of Merton, described the functioning of the 
scientific community as being based on a “winner-takes-all contest” set of rules. This 
means that creativity is most highly prized: the first scientist to achieve a result receives 
the credit, and all similar ensuing results from other scientists are ignored. This type of 
work ethic yields the necessary private (individual) benefits for production [24].  
 
2.3 Private and Public Incentives for the Production of Knowledge: the Reality Today 
The two basic institutional mechanisms that have just been briefly described in a 
historical perspective (IPRs and public support) exist today as the main incentive 
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structures to address  the lack of an economic incentive for the production of knowledge 
in decentralized markets. It is important to stress that these two incentive structures exist, 
simultaneously, as a matter of empirical fact. They result from a long and complex 
process of institutional evolution, [27]. 
These two incentive mechanisms separate knowledge into two categories. Individuals and 
firms are willing to pay for knowledge for which substantial private benefits are 
expected. These private benefits create market demand for knowledge, making it 
lucrative to produce knowledge that can be sold after IPRs have been awarded to the 
innovator. For other category of knowledge, the benefits are so widespread, uncertain or 
long-term that no individual or firm will fund the effort to produce it. Thus, the two 
institutional mechanisms tend to create knowledge of two types: one that remains in the 
public domain (funded by the public, or sometimes, voluntarily provided) and one that is 
private (protected by IPRs or by secret). This dichotomy can be applied, in a very crude 
way, to the distinction between “science” and “technology” [20, 27]. 
IPRs and public support have been used by countries as strategic policies to support the 
development of science and technology of national concern: improving domestic 
industry’s competitiveness, strengthening national defense, and addressing country-
specific social problems. The central strategic role of science and technology emerged 
during, and in the aftermath, of World War II, [28]. Advances in science and technology, 
having been crucial to the outcome of the war, became even more strongly linked to the 
state during the Cold War. This was the period under which national resources devoted to 
R&D and to technological development increased substantially, at the same time that new 
professions associated with science and technology became institutionalized. 
Salomon [29], who provides a detailed historical account of the emergence on national 
science and technology policy on which much of the last paragraph of this article is 
based, notes that in 1939 the entire US Federal R&D budget was of US$ 1 billion. The 
Manhattan Project alone, which developed the three first atomic bombs, expended US$ 2 
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billion during three years in the early 1940s6. The Apollo Program to put a man on the 
man cost US$ 5 billion per year over ten years during the 1960s.  
During this period science and technology became increasingly interdependent, 
representing a break with the historical pattern [28]. Many of the technological advances 
of the Industrial Revolution were not based on science – having resulted, rather, from the 
work of craftsmen and engineers. Individual inventors, such as Edison and Bell in the US 
or Solvay in Belgium, were able to turn inventions largely developed by individual 
persons into major technological advances, which created entire new industries. The 
“Second” Industrial Revolution was already more dependent on science, but the 
relationship was still remote. Landes [30], for example, provides a detailed description of 
the increasing importance of institutionalized science for technological development over 
the transition from the first to the second Industrial Revolutions, and beyond. As science 
and technology converged, the public/private distinction in incentives for knowledge 
production became blurred. Some companies engaged in basic research and the 
government supported technological development. 
Thus, the last half of the twentieth century is characterized by the emergence of explicit 
national science and technology policies7. These national policies include not only the 
deployment of large public resources to the promotion of R&D, [34], but also the design 
of a framework that encourages private involvement in science and technology 
development. First developed and then developing countries designed and implemented 
national science and technology policies. The enthusiasm for the development of national 
science policies from the 1950s onwards was shared by developing countries. Latin 
American countries, which had already a strong intellectual and cultural life, established 
considerable scientific and intellectual infrastructures, namely in Argentina, Brazil and 
Chile. In Africa, several countries invested in science and technology as a strategy of 
                                                 
6 Values in current dollars 
7 Although with changing rationales and shifting focuses, often associated with country-specific economic 
and political evolution [31]. See, for example, Kim and Nelson [32] and Nelson [33]. We abstain from 
 16
national affirmation (Kenya, Egypt, Ghana), often in the aftermath of newly acquired 
independence, [35]. India and Pakistan, in Asia, also invested since independence on 
building a strong national scientific and technological capability8.  
 
2.4. Should we rely on Private or Public Support to Innovation and Science? 
Knowledge generation depends on both the level and balance between public support and 
IPRs. Both are needed and interdependent. Would problems emerge if one were 
exclusively dependent on privatization (or reliance on IPRs for the production) of 
knowledge? Would an improper “institutional mix” between private and public incentives 
be harmful? The insights from analytical work on this area indicate that departing from a 
healthy mix would be harmful for two reasons. First, it would have implications on the 
diffusion of knowledge and innovation. Second, and due in part this effect on the 
diffusion of knowledge, the overall rate of knowledge generation is likely to be 
suboptimal. This section elaborates on these points.  
The way in which knowledge is diffused depends on the incentive structure under which 
it was generated, [22]. The two institutional mechanisms for the production of knowledge 
provide oppositing incentives for diffusion. While IPRs’ incentives for knowledge 
generation rest precisely on the ability to restrict the diffusion of knowledge, the value of 
public support is in the fact that knowledge is widely diffused. The challenge to the 
design of IPRs is striking the right balance on the restrictions to knowledge diffusion. 
[27]. 
Why is the diffusion of knowledge important? There are two reasons. First, the higher the 
level of diffusion, the greater the number of people that have access and can use codified 
knowledge, a concern associated with static efficiency. Second, knowledge is cumulative: 
today’s discoveries build on what was known yesterday. Therefore, the higher the 
                                                                                                                                                 
commenting on these specificities and focus, rather, on the main point, which is the existence of national 
science and technology policies. 
8 See [36, 37] for a fuller account of the emergence of national science and technology policies in 
developing countries. 
 17
diffusion of knowledge, the greater the probability of even more  breakthroughs.. 
Diffusion of knowledge is itself important for knowledge production, and thus diffusion 
of knowledge is important in terms of dynamic efficiency over the long run. 
Designing IPRs so that the level of restriction to knowledge diffusion is not excessive to 
harm dynamic and static efficiency is important. But, as David [23] argues, it is equally 
important to strike a right balance between IPRs and public support as the two main 
incentive structures supporting knowledge generation. The need for balancing the IPRs 
with public support is important because it is a way to achieve a balance between static 
and dynamic efficiency, not through the details of the way in which IPRs are designed, 
but through a “division of labor” between IPRs (which tend to restrict diffusion) and 
public support (which encourage diffusion). 
This balance between IPRs and public support should not be confused with other issues 
associated with the interaction of the public and private in the production of knowledge. 
For example, we are not necessarily arguing at this stage that private R&D is socially 
under-optimal and that public incentives are needed. This may be the case [38, 39], but 
our argument here is more fundamental. Neither are not saying that public support must 
be provided by the state. Clearly, resources need to be mobilized from agents that are 
willing to have knowledge remain largely in the public sector, but this can be achieved 
through public-private partnerships. We are not even saying that without public support 
no basic science would ever be produced. Rather than a question of “whether”, the issue 
is “how much”. 
One consequence of an over reliance on private incentives is that we may be privileging 
innovation at the expense of diffusion, which can slow the overall rate of technological 
change, or knowledge diffusion and adoption. To illustrate this possibility, Romer and 
Nelson [40] ask what would have happened if the concept behind a worksheet, first 
introduced by Lotus, would have been given exclusive rights: the competition between 
Lotus, Microsoft, and Borland (with their products Lotus 123, Excel, and QuattroPro), 
that entailed significant improvements in worksheets, might never have happened. 
Stiglitz [41] provides an argument along the same lines, using as an example the patent 
issued to Selden of a horseless and self-propelled carriage. Henry Ford later successfully 
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challenged this patent. This success opened the way for the development of the 
automobile industry. 
Another risk from the over-reliance on the property mechanism is the possibility of an 
increasing fragmentation of the ownership of pieces of knowledge. This is a possible 
concern, given the cumulative nature of knowledge, based largely on a large stock of 
publicly available “software commons”. If much of the knowledge needed for further 
inventions becomes privatized by various entities, then the transaction costs associated 
with accessing and using all these fragments of knowledge may hinder the generation of 
new “software”. Heller and Eisenberg [42] analyzed this possibility, coining the term 
“tragedy of the anticommons” to describe it. 
Public support to science and technology is often seen as just the provision of subsides. 
However, public support to science and technology can be conveyed through a variety of 
tools that meet different challenges and have different advantages and shortcomings. It is 
important to look into the “black box” of public incentives for innovation to appreciate 
the diversity of tools and variety of approaches available to policymakers to encourage 
the generation of knowledge. 
Direct public support to science and technology can been deployed through three 
mechanisms: grants, procurement contracts and prizes [27]. Grants are typically given as 
a result of a competitive process of proposal submission. Proposals are judged based on 
their scientific merits. Funding is allocated with few strings attached as long as the 
scientific program of the proposal has been complied with. Procurement for a specific 
military technology or scientific solution for a national problem entails contracting with 
an R&D performer and possibly restricting the dissemination of knowledge generated in 
the end. Finally, prizes, corresponds to a practice common during the 18th and 19th 
century, and is a combination of the grant and the procurement approach. The 
government decides on which problem is wants to see addressed (as in procurement) but 
rather than a procurement contract, it commits to award a monetary prize to whoever 
solves the specific scientific or technological problem. 
Indirect support to increase the overall level of R&D has also been provided through 
public support, often through incentives oriented towards the private sector. The rationale 
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behind public support to privately executed R&D is associated with the large positive 
spillovers that are presumed to be associated with R&D. Although the evidence at the 
micro or industry level on the existence of spillovers is controversial [38], at the 
aggregate country level the existence of spillovers is well established [43]. Indirect 
support is provided through tax exemptions or tax credits on private expenditure on 
R&D. 
The question, then, becomes, which is the best type of incentive, with public support, to 
stimulate knowledge generation. The answer is that there is no single mechanism superior 
in every circumstance to the others. Wright [44] shows that the identification of the best 
incentive depends on the market and technological conditions, and that each is preferable 
to others in different situations. We will next briefly compare each of these mechanisms. 
Prizes 
Prizes can be considered a “pull” type of mechanism, in the sense that it is the prospect of 
gains from discovery that entices the development of R&D. A “prize” incentive structure 
commits a certain amount of resources to reward the generation of new knowledge, but 
only if this knowledge is produced are the funds disbursed. Prizes are, therefore, similar 
conceptually to IPRs. However, the reward is now chosen not by the market but by the 
public. Thus, when there is a clear social and public need for knowledge and there is no 
market, prizes may be a good alternative when IPRs fail. 
Procurement 
In other cases procurement is the best solution, namely when both prizes and IPRs create 
incentives that generate an R&D race. This may lead to over investment on R&D. If it is 
possible to identify and control the capable R&D performers, it may be better to award a 
public contract [21]9. Procurement is a “push” type of incentive, since public resources 
are disbursed as R&D is being executed, and have to be paid regardless of the success of 
the project. 
                                                 
9 The reason is that IPRs, awarding monopoly power are equivalent to a tax on a specific market, while 
public contracting if funded out of general tax revenues, which is less distortionary. This, again, assumes 
that information problems associated with identifying the capable performers are ignored or are inexistent. 
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Tax Incentives 
Tax incentives for R&D are also “push” type of incentives. Tax incentives can be broad 
(so that they benefit any type of R&D) or they can be targeted (to benefit only specific 
types of R&D). In the first case, the incentive generates the production of any type of 
knowledge, while the second presumes that the public has, as with prizes and 
procurement, chosen a specific objective for knowledge creation. Tax incentives are 
transformed into a “pull” incentive when, instead of being awarded to the execution of 
R&D in a specific field, are associated with sales of the innovation that the R&D is 
expected to generate. 
Grants 
For prizes, procurement and target tax incentives, it is presumed that it is possible to 
identify a specific knowledge need. When there are specific needs for new knowledge 
and this knowledge has not yet been created, although it is clearly in reach given the 
current scientific and technological status, there is a “knowledge-gap” between need and 
incentive. However, often there is no means for articulating a specific and identifiable 
need. Some knowledge is too general or  broad  in the benefits to be circumscribed to a 
specific utilization. In this case, prizes, procurement or targeted tax incentives are not 
adequate incentives. Grants are the solution in these cases, and the outcome is likely to be 
contributions to basic scientific knowledge. 
The Secret is in the Mix 
Our main point here is, beyond the description of the different types of public incentives, 
to argue that there is not necessarily a single best solution to structure public support for 
knowledge generation. In line with the over-reliance on IPRs in comparison to public 
support of science, even when the need for public support is acknowledged, the 
preference tends to be the  “pull” type of incentives. Our contention is that over-reliance 
“pull” type of incentive structures (prizes, tax credits on sales) at the cost of “push” 
(grants, tax credits on R&D) may be inefficient in the long run. IPRs, prizes and 
procurement may work well when a clear need, even a scientific puzzle, has been clearly 
identified. Additionally, “pull” mechanisms may not be sufficient to spur investments in 
knowledge when substantial opportunity costs exist. That is, if a firm facing the prospects 
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of a prize sees an alternative market-induced investment that yields much higher returns 
may, in spite of the prize, decide not to perform research anyway. In other terms, 
establishing the value of the prize needed to induce research is quite problematic. 
Over-reliance on IPRs is not just a problem of the lack of access. If the concern with 
access to existing knowledge is deep-seated, the public purchase of patents is a possible 
solution, as is compulsory licensing. The issue, rather, is that without “push” and, 
specifically, without grants, fundamental knowledge for the overall progress of science 
and technology may never be discovered, or take much longer to discover. 
Increasing reliance on IPRs is a legitimate policy choice of any society. However, as we 
will see in the next section, one should be careful in using the US as a case of   
employing IPRs as the method for promoting innovation. 
 
 
3- A Closer Look at the Historical Record and the Present Practice of Support to 
Innovation in the US 
 
This section turns towards an empirical analysis of the historical and current policies to 
support innovation and science and technology in the US. 
 
3.1. Historical Analysis 
As we described in section 2, the large, systematic and sustained public support to 
science and technology is an “institutional invention” of the second half of the twentieth 
century. The ambition to establish a strong scientific and technological capability was 
shared by developed and developing countries alike. It was perhaps in the United States 
that this ambition followed with greatest enthusiasm and commitment. It is always 
enlightening to listen to Vannevar Bush’s eloquence, the main proponent in the US for 
the launching of a substantial public effort to support science and technology [45]: 
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Science, by itself, provides no panacea for individual, social, and economic ills. It can be effective 
in the national welfare only as a member of a team, whether the conditions be peace or war. But 
without scientific progress no amount of achievement in other directions can insure our health, 
prosperity, and security as a nation in the modern world. 
On whether the support to science should be the responsibility of the national 
government, Bush [45] wrote, still using some of the World War II rhetoric: 
[…S]ince health, well-being, and security are proper concerns of Government, scientific progress 
is, and must be, of vital interest to Government. Without scientific progress the national health 
would deteriorate; without scientific progress we could not hope for improvement in our standard 
of living or for an increased number of jobs for our citizens; and without scientific progress we 
could not have maintained our liberties against tyranny. 
 
The US established the National Science Foundation (NSF) in 1950, which has been the 
main US agency devoted to funding basic research. Results from NSF funded research 
include bar codes, computer aided design/computer aided manufacturing (CAD/CAM), 
fiber optics, the Internet and web browsers. In the environmental area, NSF funded 
research resulted in the understanding of the effects of acid rain and the identification of 
the Antarctic ozone hole10. 
The US public support to science and technology was extended with the creation of new 
agencies (such as NASA) and the support of research in areas of strategic national 
interest, such as health (through the National Institutes of Health) and energy (through the 
Department of Energy). 
However, as Mowery [46] and David [23] show, there has been a clear tendency to 
reduce the public support to science and technology and to rely more heavily  – and to 
give increasing importance – on  IPRs as the incentive for knowledge generation. As an 
illustration of this trend, we showed in section 1 that the ratio of the public to the private 
funding in the United States has been steadily decreasing, after the build-up that followed 
the (Viet Nam) war, as the private sector takes an increasing share of overall funding for 
R&D. Figure  complements this information, showing that private spending on R&D has 
                                                 
10 See: http://www.nsf.gov/od/lpa/nsf50/nsfoutreach/htm/n50_z2/pages_z3/text_list.htm. 
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been on an increasing trend, while public spending has decreased (in real terms) from the 
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Figure 5- Private and Public Spending on R&D in the US. Source: US NSB, 2000, [1]. 
 
Thus, there has, indeed, been a relative withdrawal of the public in funding R&D, and, in 
addition, a “swing of the pendulum” towards property-based incentives and away from 
public-based incentives. This has been heightened by the rapid development of 
information and telecommunication technologies, which facilitate the rapid diffusion of 
codified knowledge and create opportunities for private R&D. The emergence of the 
Internet, in particular, has been a great reason for concern for music and print publishers. 
However, there may actually be gains to the producers of knowledge when sharing does 
occur. 
This trend in the United States – itself an important fact given the sheer size and scientific 
strength of the US science system globally – can also be observed affecting and 
 24
influencing most developed countries11. Indeed, the same can bee seen at the global level, 
as we witness great interest in bringing IPRs to the global scale. So why should not other 
countries follow the US strategy? The historical analysis demands that we consider two 
important dimensions of the US science and technology policy. 
First, as indicated in section 1, although the increasing reliance on IPRs is associated with 
a surge in patenting in the US, this cannot unequivocally be interpreted as an upsurge in 
innovative activity. Rather, it seems that it is a direct response to policy changes 
associated with the protection of less relevant inventions in areas previously excluded 
from coverage. However, a rigorous assessment of the real effectiveness of changes in 
the patenting law in universities and small businesses that permit research results from 
federally funded projects to be patented by the researchers has yet to be conducted (the 
Bayh-Dole act). Intended to stimulate innovation, this change could also undermine even 
further the “division of labor” between basic science and applied technology, in part 
associated with, respectively, public support and IPRs [47]. 
Second, it is important to consider the cumulative effect of decades of sustained large 
scale public support to science and technology. In fact, in cumulative terms, only very 
recently has public support been surpassed by private support to R&D (Figure ). 
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Figure 6- Cumulative Private and Public Support to R&D. Source: US NSB, 2000, [1]. 
 
Why is the cumulative “effect” important? Because it is a proxy for the effects associated 
with long-lasting investments in R&D. Knowledge is cumulative in nature. Innovations 
build upon basic science and previous innovations, which have had to been supported in 
the past. Similarly, the cumulative support is reflected in equipment and, much more 
importantly, institutions, such as the modern US research university, on which both 
private and public R&D and the training of people depends. Few, if any other, countries 
can lay claim to the sustained and large scale support – from the public sector – found in 
the US. Even if now the “pendulum” is swinging towards the private, the US, in a sense, 
can afford to do it. Others countries without the history of capacity building that is 
reflected in the cumulative public spending may be prodding creativity and innovation 
where no “raw materials” to do so exist. 




3.2. Structural Analysis 
The structural analysis presented here considers how expenditures are allocated across 
institutions and scientific areas. The main objective is to show that the “public has not 
pulled back” from core concerns of US policy, and that the pulling-back has been much 
less pronounced where, according to the analytical points made in section 2, the public 
has a clear and very distinctive role to play, that is often unique. 
In fact, the “public” has not retreated from funding basic R&D. On the contrary, it can 
even be argued that public support to basic R&D is even inducing private spending on 
basic R&D (Figure 7). Perhaps more importantly, the “cumulative” investment in basic 
R&D continues to be led, by an overwhelming margin, by public expenditure. The US is 
investing in its long-term scientific future using mostly public, rather than private, 
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Figure 8- Cumulative Public and Private Spending on Basic R&D. Source: US NSB, 2000, [1]. 
 
Still, it is possible to discern an increasing relative importance of private funding. Figure  
compares the ratio of public vs. private expenditure of the total expenditure (vertical axis) 
and the ratio only for basic expenditure (horizontal axis). It is possible to identify three 
stages in Figure . First, the growth of total public funding overall through 1965, when 
public expenditure was two times that of private expenditure. Throughout this period, the 
ratio in basic expenditure remain relatively stable at around 2, increasing to 2.5 at the 
peak of total public/private expenditure. This is the “launch” period of the US S&T 
system. Then, from 1966 through 1987, the total public/private ratio decreased rapidly 
but, at the same time, the basic R&D public/private ratio increased rapidly. This is the 
“specialization” period, as the US public funding focuses more on basic R&D, as applied 
and research and development are left increasingly to the private sector. Finally, through 
the 1990s, the trend is that both ratios are decreasing, although the basic science one is 
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Figure 9- Ratio of Public vs. Private Expenditure for Total R&D and for Basic R&D. 
 
Another important aspect that the “structural analysis” reveals is that much of the retreat 
in public funding in the US is related with the pulling back of financial support to 
defense-related R&D. In fact, for the first time since 1980, the non-defense related R&D 
public expenditure in the US is equal to the defense related expenditure (Figure ). It is 
also important to note that the abrupt decrease in public expenditure of 1987 is related to 
the decrease of the defense-related expenditure. The non-defense public expenditure on 
R&D in the US is on an increasing trend for more than 20 years. So where the new public 
money is is going?12 
 
                                                 
12 It should also be noted that, especially over the 1990s, there were pressures to reduce overall public 





















































































 Defense Nondefense  
Figure 10- Spending on R&D for Defense and non-Defense related purposes. Source: US NSB, 2000, 
[1]. 
 
The growth in non-defense public R&D expenditure is principally in health and basic 
science (Figure ). In 1999 the US Congress has committed itself to double the funding of 
the National Institutes of Health (which funds research in health-related areas) and of the 
National Science Foundation (which funds basic science). Preliminary budget requests of 
the Bush administration for 2003 comply with this commitment, putting the funding of 
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Figure 11- Evolution of Public R&D Non-Defense Expenditure. Source: US NSB, 2000, [1]. 
 
Finally, the public allocation of R&D resources to universities has exhibited a persistent 
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Figure 12- Evolution of the US Federal Public Allocation of R&D. 
 
Figure  shows that, while historically federal labs and private industry have received most 
of the federal funds (private industry with two great peaks by the mid 1960s and by the 
mid 1980s), if current trends continue universities will become the main receivers of 
public support to R&D in the US. 
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4. Conclusions 
The analysis above describes the trajectory of the US incentives to science and 
technology and do find that, during the second half of the twentieth century, there has 
been a steady shift of support from the public to the private sector. Additionally, 
intellectual property rights and other market-based incentive structures have been 
extended and used more extensively. This trend has been identified, and shown to be 
reason for concern, by researchers in the field [48]. We share these concerns but we also 
find that there has been “core” science and technology activities in which the public 
intervention in the US had not declined. We find that this is particularly the case for US 
universities. Thus, we conclude by analyzing the evolution of research in US higher 
education and find two major trends: an increasing diversity in the number of institutions 
of different types other than universities and a steady and continuous public funding of 
the leading US universities.  
The lessons we take from our analysis are the following. First, the US may be able to 
afford to “shift the pendulum” from public to private incentive structures because of its 
relatively long history of channeling substantial public funds for science and technology. 
This has allowed the construction of an infrastructure now used largely by the private 
sector. Attempting to “shift the pendulum” to the private sector without the infrastructure 
provided by a long history of public support may not only be misguided but ineffective. 
Second, we argue that the US has not compromised public support for core areas or in 
those fields in which there is a clear perception that market incentives are not sufficient 
for meeting the strategic targets of the US policy (see, for example, the doubling in the 
budget of the National Institutes of Health over the past five years). The implication is 
that there is a considerable “policy diversity” in the US practice and that all aspects of 
this diversity should be considered when using the US as a reference. 
We have shown in section 1 of this paper that the structure and financing of science and 
technology activities in the US have clearly undergone the shift from relying and 
supporting public science to a stronger emphasis on “market-based” incentives for 
science, technology and innovation. Given the strong economic performance of the US 
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over the 1990s, this shift has influenced policies in most OECD countries, and especially 
in Europe [3,4,13]. 
In section 2 we noted that, from an analytical perspective, the continuation of this shift to 
the point where only private incentives remain is not desirable. In fact, for many authors, 
the trend as it exists presently is already reason for concern, since rather than what theory 
prescribes – that there should be a mix of public and private incentives to science, 
technology and innovation – we may have reached a situation where incentives in the US 
favor too heavily  the private side of the mix. 
However, in section 3 we show that to say that the pendulum has swung too heavily from 
the public to the private set of incentives for R&D in the US is an oversimplification. 
Even though the shares of private versus public support have been moving towards 
making the private side more important, if one considers the cumulative investments over 
time (aggregation over time, that is, taking the integral to account for past investments) 
public and private expenditure on R&D in the US are on par. Additionally, public support 
has not been scarce for long term scientific endeavors (NSF, support to basic science), 
nor to those areas in which there is demand for R&D that the private sector alone is not 
tackling (health and NIH, NSF), nor to those institutions that depend on public support to 
maintain their institutional integrity (universities) so that they can persist in playing their 
unique and fundamental role. Exogenous policies not directly related with science and 
technology policy options (the retreat in defense investments, reductions in public 
spending in the US) may also account for some of the “retreat” of the public set of 
incentives in the US. 
In fact, the US has historically pursued a wide range of approaches to encourage research 
and to build research infrastructure. New approaches have been adopted over time as the 
nature of the research/innovation endeavor evolved. The infrastructure is today quite 
diverse and robust with multiple performers. Similarly, the set of incentives to encourage 
research is diverse. Given the high uncertainty surrounding scientific research and 
innovation, this robust research infrastructure system minimizes the risk of poor targeting 
of research priorities, and the mix of public and private incentives strengthens this 
robustness. It is clear, in fact, that along with private incentives, public policy is needed 
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to mobilize investment of social resources in new technologies and to insure the health of 
the overall enterprise. The expansion of research in health, the continued support to the 
NSF and basic science, and the recently announcement of increasing investments in space 
exploration, clearly reinforce the needed role of the public sector in mobilizing the 
research enterprise. 
Our conclusion is that there is a considerable “policy diversity” in the US practice, and 
that all aspects of this diversity should be considered when taking into account the US as 
a reference. It is incorrect to conclude, prematurely, that, the US system is being driven 
by private incentives for S&T. “Blanket” recommendations to enhance property rights or 
to limit public resource allocation, based on the US experience, may be misguided. Even 
if there is a clear shift towards more private incentives in the US, there is a long history 
of past investments and a current division of labor or specialization that cannot be 
replicated in systems with a lower scale and complexity. The key elements of the US 
history are those of diversity of policies and increasing “institutional specialization” and 
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